Summary

Digital Appearance
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When the high-speed computer was first developed it was found to have certain unforeseen characteristics which have, without exaggeration, transformed our entire picture of man and the way we see ourselves. Here, I shall focus on just two of these characteristics. A major part of the epistemological endeavour of the Modern Age went into making the numerical code adequate to the world, developing ever more sophisticated and elegant mathematical methods. High-speed computers have made this work superfluous. They calculate so quickly that they are content simply to add 1 and 0, i.e. to "digitalize", thus dispensing with all that mathematical sophistication. The computer calculates with two fingers, but does it so rapidly that it can calculate better than the most gifted mathematicians. The impact has been nothing less than revolutionary because the computer's introduction showed that mathematical thought, which until then was regarded as one of the highest human faculties, could be mechanized, thereby lowering its intellectual status. On the other hand, new tasks emerged with the need to program the computers: calculating was replaced by structural analysis of the universe of numbers. Mathematical thought had to take a step away from itself backwards into systems analysis, thus becoming something else.

The second characteristic of the high-speed computer I want to focus on is the surprising fact that it can not only calculate but also compute, i.e. not only analyze equations in numbers but also synthesize these numbers into shapes. That is an astounding discovery if one bears in mind that calculatory thinking has penetrated deep into phenomena and these have broken down into particles as a result of the advance of calculation. In this way the world has taken on the structure of a universe of numbers, a development which poses confusing cognitive and epistemological questions, since computers have demonstrated that calculatory thought not only breaks down (analyses) the world into particles but can also reconstitute (synthesize) them again. Allow me to mention just two dramatic examples: Firstly, we know that so-called life can be analyzed not only into particles, i.e. into genes, but thanks to genetic engineering the genes themselves can be reconstituted into new information in order to produce "artificial organisms". Secondly, the computer can synthesize alternative worlds which it projects from algorithms, i.e. from symbols of calculatory thought - alternative worlds which can be just as concrete as the world around us. Such projected worlds can contain anything: the mathematically conceivable, including both the possible and phenomena which are "impossible" in our physical environment, e.g. four-dimensional bodies or marzipan men. Technically, computers have not reached that point; but in principle nothing stands in their way.

At this point we should pause for breath and take stock of the dizzy path already trodden in our deliberations on the nature of "digital appearance". The view now opening up can be described as follows: mankind has engaged in formal thinking at least since the Bronze Age, e.g. drainage plans drawn out on clay slabs. In the course of history formal thinking became subordinated to processual thinking and not until the beginning of the Modern Age did it come to the fore as "analytical geometry", i.e as geometric forms re-coded in numbers. That kind of disciplined formal thought allowed the rise of modern science and technology, but it ultimately came to a theoretical and practical impasse. The computer was invented to remove practical obstacles, but this development only radicalized the theoretical problems. At the outset of the Modern Age scholars searched for something that cannot deceive and believed they had found it in numerical thought with its clear, explicit and disciplined language of numbers. But then the suspicion arose that science was only projecting its numerical code outwards; that the supposed laws of nature, for example, are actually equations imposed upon nature. Later came the more fundamental suspicion that the whole universe - from the Big Bang to Heat Death and with all its fields and relations - is a projection which is "experimentally" pulled back again by calculatory thinking. After all, computers now show that we are able to project and recover not only this one universe but as many such universes as you like. In short, our cognitive, epistemological problem, and thus our existential problem, is whether everything, including ourselves, must in the end be understood as digital appearance.

With this approach we can take the bull of alternative worlds by its horns. For if everything deceives, if everything is digital appearance - not only the synthetic picture on the computer screen but even the typewriter I'm using, these typing fingers and the thoughts being expressed through my fingers - then the word appearance becomes meaningless. What remains is the insight that everything must be seen more or less as a dense scattering of point-like elements, of bits. That is the digital view of the world proposed by science and demonstrated to us by the computer. From now on we have to live with it, even if we think it's a confounded nuisance.

What do those people really do who sit in front of computers, push keys and generate lines, areas and bodies? They realize possibilities. They compile and plot points in accordance with precisely formulated programs. In so doing, they are realizing both an exterior and an interior: they realize alternative worlds and also themselves. From possibilities they "design" realities which become all the more effective the more densely they are amassed and plotted. In this way "the new anthropology" is being put into practice: "We" is a knot of possibilities which takes on concrete shape as it gathers up and compiles ever more densely the possibilities within itself and whirling around it: compiling becomes the creative shaping of possibilities. Computers are apparatuses for realizing innerhuman, interhuman and extrahuman possibilities through exact calculatory thinking. This formulation can be taken as one possible definition of "computer". We are no longer subjects of a given objective world, but projects for alternative worlds. From an obsequious, subjective position we have straightened up for projecting. We are growing up. We know that we dream.

The existential transformation from subject into project is not the consequence of a "free decision" of some kind. We are forced to make this step, just as our distant predecessors were forced to stand on two legs when the ecological crisis occurring at the time made it necessary for them to find a way of moving across the thinning forests, through the widening interstices between wilting trees. For our part, we now have to see through the objects around us - and through our own Self, once called the spirit, the soul or simply identity - and comprehend them as computations of dots. We can no longer be subjects because there are no objects whose subjects we might be, and there is no hard core which could be the subject of some object. All this we have left behind as an infantile illusion and must dare to step forward into the wide open field of possibilities. For us, the adventure of becoming truly human has entered a new phase. That is seen most clearly in the fact that we can no longer make a distinction between truth and appearance or between science and art. Nothing is a "given" for us except possibilities to be realized. What we call "the world", what our senses have computed (with methods not fully understood) into perceptions and then into feelings, wishes and knowledge, and even the senses themselves, are reified computational processes. Science calculates the world in the form it was once put together. It deals with facts, with what is made, and not with data. The scientists are the computer artists avant la lettre and the outcome of science does not consist in "objective findings" of some kind, but in models for handling what has been computed.

In recognizing that science is a kind of art form, we are not degrading science; on the contrary, this insight has turned science into a paradigm for all the other arts. It is increasingly apparent that all art forms only become factual, i.e. produces realities, when they have cast off their empiricism and reached the theoretical precision achieved in science. And that is the "digital appearance" I am talking about: all art forms are becoming exact scientific disciplines through digitalization and can no longer be distinguished from science.

The really new aspect here is that from now on we have to behold beauty as the only acceptable criteria of truth: "Art is better than Truth." This can already be seen in what is called computer art: the more beautiful the digital appearance, the more real and true the projected alternative worlds. Man as project, as systems analyst and synthesist engaged in formal thinking, is an artist. "Digital appearance" is the light that illuminates for us the night of gaping emptiness, the void around us and in us. And we are the spotlights, projecting alternative worlds against the void and into the void.

Translation: Stephen Cox

We are living tubes (worms). The world flows in through one of our openings (the mouth) to flow out again through the other opening (the anus). This is why we can distinguish between "forward" and "backward". Most of us are bilaterally symmetrical, and this is why we can distinguish between "right" and "left".

Originally we all crawled forward and backward, and left and right, on the beach of some Precambrian ocean, and thus there was no need or possibility for us to distinguish between "upward" and "downward". Somewhat later some of us (the birds and insects) took off from the ground, and some others (the cephalopods and humans) stood upright, though still sticking to the surface. For those who had taken off, a sphere of dimensions like "up to the right" or "down behind" opened up; for those who began to stand upright it was instead a hemisphere that became accessible to locomotion. This may be taken to be a description of *vital space*, of which all other kinds of space are either derivatives or abstractions.

If you consider the hemisphere of human space you will find that it looks more like a box than a bowl, because it is shallow. We can measure the length and breadth of the space we cross in thousands of miles, but until quite recently the height of our space only measured a few yards and its depth but a few inches. This wide and long but shallow box that is our vital space is better suited for geometry (measurement of the ground) than for topology (science of space), because it consists of two dimensions to which a third has been added. We upright worms think geometrically; equations of the third degree make us nervous, and we had better leave topology to birds, bees, and angels. If we divide our vital space (*Lebensraum*), we divide it into areas, and we never fight about cubic miles (even if we have an air force).

This flat box of ours stands still, and things move around within it. You might say that those things move with time, and that time blows through space like the wind through a room with open windows. Philosophers have thought deeply about time, and about how it relates to space, yet nobody will deny that time and space can be easily distinguished. Nobody will mistake a watch for a yardstick, unless he's crazy. Sometimes we do have a curious feeling about distances: is this place two miles away or two hours? You might also say that the distance between New York and Paris is $ 1,000. But these are unnecessary, idle reflections. The fact is that we live in a rigid space to be measured in miles, and that we move with a time to be measured in hours. Or at least this has been true so far.

But we humans have the curious ability to put ourselves in the place of somebody else: we are capable of abstraction. We can, for instance, ask ourselves how space looks from the point of view of a galaxy (of which we know, of course, that it cannot look but can only be looked at). And if we ask such a question, we find to our surprise that we cannot answer in words but only in numbers. The reason is that words are used to articulate vital space, while numbers are more abstract. (This is, by the way, a very curious reason.) Now if we articulate how space looks if seen by a galaxy, we will have to formulate equations of the fourth dimension. This is very uncomfortable, because even three dimensions like cubic miles make us nervous. But we now dispose of apparatuses that may help us to perceive such equations. They are called "plotters", and they can generate synthetic images out of numbers and show them on computer screens: we can see for ourselves what space looks like from a galaxy's point of view. We call this "outer space" or "cosmic space", and we even build vehicles to explore those regions closest to where we are.

Space is just as big as it is old, namely about fifteen billion years old and fifteen billion light years in diameter. It expands with time until time is exhausted, and this will happen when everything in space is evenly distributed. Because although space is empty, it is full of possibilities for things to happen accidentally, and for the results to be there for a time and then disappear again. The things that happen there (like the galaxies at which we look, and like ourselves) are curves within the field of the possibilities of space-time. For instance, the planet Earth is a curve within the field of gravitation of the sun, which again is a curve, and so forth. You can calculate all of this in algorithms, and you can show it on a computer screen, and now that you have uttered it in so many words, you can understand it. But do you?

With this our capacity for abstraction is by no means exhausted. We may also abstract ourselves from our vital space and put ourselves in the place of the particles that compose us. Here the problem is different. In the case of the galaxies we may ask: what would space look like if the galaxies could look at it? But in the case of the particles we must ask: what would space look like if there were any particles we ourselves could look at? Because we may look at galaxies, but if we look for particles like quarks we see only traces. But, we might ask, if we cannot even see these particles, why should we try to put ourselves in their place? The answer is, we must do so, not only because of nuclear power and Chernobyl, but because we are able to calculate it. Now let this be put more carefully: since we cannot say exactly where a particle is, we should better say of that space not what or how it is but what and how it might be. This is why we should call it a "virtual space", and only then try to understand it.

The equations that describe virtual space are even more exotic than those that calculate cosmic space, because they calculate probabilities, which is to say strictly nothing – at least nothing yet. Probability calculus states what might be, but it says even more than that. It says that reality (that which is) and unreality (that which is not) are the two horizons of probability, and that the space of particles somehow oscillates between the two. This is more or less what that monstrous term "probability wave" means. But if you try to imagine space as that sort of wave, you have not yet understood what virtual space means. You must consider two other things as well: first, anything you say about that space is more or less probable, that is, meaningless nonsense, and second, there is another monstrous term, namely, "quantic jump", and it says that a particle may jump from one orbit to another without spending time while jumping. In other words, a particle may be simultaneously at two different places within that space. Do not try to imagine such a horror (you will not succeed), but admit instead that what we are talking about is virtual time within virtual space, a not-yet-space with a not-yet-time, which is to say: we are talking about a situation in which words fail.

It is a fact that for more than a century we have been learning how to fly, and that, although we have not yet learned to do it properly, we can already experience space more or less as birds do. Another fact is that for some time now we have had things that begin with the prefix "tele-", which literally may mean "far" but which really means "to bring nearer". Thus with the telescope we can bring things like the moon and the planets so near that they no longer look as if they are in cosmic space; thanks to the telephone we can approach people who cannot be heard and seen in vital space; thanks to the telegraph we can correspond with people over long distances as if they were in the same town in which we live; thanks to television we can see events as they happen in a quite different place within vital space; and thanks to telematics we can become neighbors with everyone equipped with the same type of apparatus.

But there is another fact that may be even more decisive: we no longer have a feeling that we can trust our vital space or the time that blows through it. We are now capable of simulating things so perfectly that we can no longer distinguish them well from "true things". For instance, we can no longer say for sure whether we are watching a real or a staged scene when looking at the TV screen, or whether that voice that speaks to us is human or the voice of an apparatus. On the other hand, the fact that we can be telepresent instantly all over the place makes us doubt whether we are truly present here and now, or whether we are only dreaming. This means that we can no longer distinguish well between fact and fiction, between science and art, between the real and the unreal. Now this is a feeling that accords very well with virtual space, where true and untrue statements have literally no meaning.

If you take those two sets of facts together – on the one hand, vital space is no longer closed but is opening up to cosmic space, and on the other hand, it is becoming as untrustworthy as virtual space – you begin to understand why all those people speak about cosmic and virtual spaces. They no longer feel at home within vital space, so they are beginning to crawl out into those other spaces that can be calculated, and that everybody can contemplate on computer screens, but that nobody can understand in the true sense of that term. The upright worm that we are is beginning to take off, but nobody can say as yet where it is going, or what it is plunging into. We cannot even say whether it is going to continue to be a worm, whether it is going to be crushed, or whether it is changing into a bird or an angel.

The City as a Wave-trough in the Flood of Images
p. 58

We usually imagine the city something like this: houses (private economic spaces) surround a market place (a political, public space) and above them on a hill stands a temple (a theoretical, sacred space). One may ponder endlessly on how these three types of space should be linked. The Ancients believed that economy had to serve politics, and politics had to serve theory; for theory leads to wisdom and salvation. The philosophers and doctors of the church were seen as the kings of the city. The revolutionary artisans of the Renaissance thought that economy and theory had to serve politics, since the latter leads to human freedom and the ability to change oneself through labour. The citizens were seen as the kings of the city. Nowadays, many believe that politics and theory have to serve the economy; for the economy leads to the satisfaction our demands and to happiness. In this view, the consumers are seen as the kings of the city. We have here three interpretations of the cityscape as we generally know it.

As a model, this type of image is no longer of any use to us. The three urban spaces now intermesh like "fuzzy sets". The public space penetrates the private thanks to the cable (via television, for example). The private space penetrates the public thanks to machines (such as cars). In the city there is no longer anything really public and really private. Moreover, the theoretical space has entered the other two to such an extent that it has changed its appearance radically and we can no longer recognize it. "Theory" means contemplation and is sacred because it reaches beyond everyday hustle and bustle. It has turned into the phenomena of weekend, holiday, retirement and unemployment. Today the theoretical space is not tied to church and school but to the sports field, the discotheque and Club Méditerrané. These settlements are now open to what was once the economic and the political. We can close the file on the traditional cityscape of three separate spaces; it is nothing more than an historical reference point.

We are the individuals who come together in the city. This view of Man was the basis of the old cityscape and has now lost its usefulness. Everything is divisible and there can be no unitary individual. Not only atoms but also all mental phenomena can be broken down at will into particles; actions into, say, "actoms", decisions into "decidems", perceptions into "stimuli", visual ideas into "pixels". The question of whether one will ultimately arrive at the indivisible is metaphysical. The human being cannot be regarded as an individual but, on the contrary, as a dense scattering of particles. Man is calculable. The notorious "Self" should be seen as a knot in which various fields cross, e.g. the many physical fields with ecological, psychic and cultural fields. The notorious "Self" turns out to be the shell rather than the kernel. It holds together the scattered particles, "containing" them. It is a mask. This means that the city cannot be a place where individuals come together; on the contrary, it is a groove across fields and in it various masks are distributed. The Self does not enter the city to meet others. The opposite is the case: only in the city does the Self emerge as the Other of the others. The model of the city as an institution for hiring masks opens up a new perspective on urban history. The first cities offered only a few masks, e.g. those of the magician, the warrior and the homosexual, and everyone had to dance behind one of these masks. The most recent cities offer all kinds of masks and permit their dancers to wear one on top of another, such as the mask of the taxpayer over that of the father. That is political (civic) progress. Nonetheless, what is hidden behind the old masks is still there behind the new: a swarm of divisible particles.

The new image of Man looks roughly like this: we have to imagine a network of interhuman relations, a "field of intersubjective relations". The threads of this web must be conceived as channels through which information (ideas, feelings, intentions and knowledges etc.) flows. These threads get temporarily knotted and form what we call "human subjects". The totality of the threads constitutes the concrete sphere of life and the knots are abstract extrapolations. We realize this when we untie them. Like an onion they have no core. Put another way: The "Self" ("I") is an abstract, conceived point around which concrete relations wrap themselves. "I" forms the point which is addressed by the word "you". The density of the webs of interhuman relations differs from place to place within the network. The greater the density the more "concrete" the relations. These dense points form wave troughs in the field, a field one has to picture as constantly undulating. At these dense points the knots move closer together, reciprocally "actualizing" each other. The wave troughs exert an "attractive" force on the surrounding field (pulling it into their gravitational field) so that more and more interhuman relations are drawn in from the periphery. Each wave is a focus for actualizing interhuman virtualities. These wave troughs shall be called "cities".

Having looked at the cityscape in this way - and assuming the necessary imagination has been mobilized - one cannot help noticing its "immateriality". In the city one sees neither houses nor squares nor temples, but just a tangle of wires, a jumble of cables. A stroll through Cologne may help to make the picture somewhat more material. Whereas Heinrich Heine once wrote that the city with its Holy cathedral was reflected in the Holy waters of the Rhine, we have to try to conceive the cityscape reflected in this field of relations. What we notice first of all are the shopwindows in which masks are offered for identification. We identify with and identify ourselves as a dress, a pair of shoes, a cooking pan. We become whatever we are only when we start dancing in this dress, in this pan. The whole of Cologne is made up of these showcases. The masks are on offer everywhere. We dance in the mask of a TV picture (identifying ourselves with it and in it), in the mask of a party member, of an academic title, of a family role, an art genre, a philosophical view. Cologne turns out to be a wave trough in the field of interhuman relations in which the relations are gathered up in masks in order to actualize the possibilities contained within them. Cologne's houses and squares and the Cathedral must be seen as surface phenomena, as coagulated, "materialized" masks, as a sort of archaeological kitchen garbage.

In this sense the new city would be an place where "we" identify ourselves reciprocally as "I" and "you", where "identity" and "difference" determine each other. That is not only a question of scattering but one of switching. Such a city presupposes an optimum scattering of interhuman relations: "others" should become "neighbours".

We have to stop trying to recognize (understand) ourselves and others, and start trying to recognize (acknowledge) others and recognize (rediscover) ourselves in them. We have to break out of the capsule of the Self and try to design ourselves into the concrete intersubjectivity. We have to turn ourselves from subjects into projects. The new city would then be a projection of interhuman projects. That sounds "utopian", which it literally is since the new city cannot be geographically localized but is wherever people open up to each other.

All this has been told in images: the images of the cityscape, of the world, of mankind, of masks. Talking in pictures is unavoidable. It has become impossible to describe the world and ourselves in it. Discursive language and writing are no longer appropriate to this task: everything is calculated through and through, and swarms of point-like bits are indescribable. They can be calculated and the algorithms can be re-coded into pictures. This means that although the world with ourselves in it has become indescribable, it is calculable and has therefore become conceivable again.

Translation: Stephen Cox

On Tents
p. 69

The essence of a tent is that you erect it, hide under it and then fold it up again. Given such a formulation of "tent-essence", who wouldn't think straight away of an umbrella? In fact, the umbrella is the form of tent with which we have the most concrete experience. But if we are to do justice to the essence of the tent, we must think beyond the usual umbrellas, including sunshades and parasols, and consider similar screen devices such as the parachute or even the TV screen. As always, what strikes us here is the fact that architects have paid little attention to the tent. While there are all sorts of stupid objects around us, umbrella-like devices must be counted among the most stupid. Umbrellas themselves, for example, are relatively complicated apparatuses which fail to work just when they are supposed to (e.g. in the wind), offer meagre shelter, are uncomfortable to transport, and constitute a public danger for the eyes of anyone nearby who doesn't happen to be holding one; not to mention the fact that they are always being left behind or mistakenly taken by others. Although fashions in umbrellas come and go, there has been no real technological progress ever since

the ancient Egyptians, and if we were to say, "God, the Eternal, is my umbrella", this utterance would be deemed as blasphemy.

What is so excruciatingly stupid about umbrella apparatuses, and tents in general (given that the umbrella is tent-essence)? Ever since the ancient Egyptians architects (and tent designers of all kinds) have not yet discovered that they are dealing here with wind and not with gravity; that the danger with umbrellas and tents is not the risk of collapse but of being caught by the wind and swept away. That will change. We will learn to think "immaterially" once the walls have been torn down.

So let us try once again to articulate the essence of the tent. It is an umbrella-like shelter one erects in the wind, uses against the wind, only to fold up again in the wind. Given such a formulation of tent-essence, who wouldn't think of sails? In fact, the sail is the only form of tent which really gets to grips with the wind. The tent as an umbrella tries to brace itself against the wind, but the tent as a sail attempts to exploit the power of the wind. If the umbrella is stupid, the sail is clever. A properly built sailing ship can be steered against almost any wind and is only powerless in the face of calm air. And a glider can manipulate the wind not only horizontally but also vertically. So when designing houses, future architects will have to consider not only umbrellas but also kites and how children let them dance in the wind.

As we tease out the hidden essence of the tent, it becomes apparent that parachutes and gliders are two variations of the tent theme, and we see in the tent a canvass screen billowing in the wind. The canvass in opposition to the wall and the billowing in the wind in opposition to breaking the wind - not the worst point of departure for analyzing the cultural changes breaking over our heads. But before pursuing the wall problem, we have to consider the wind and that brings us to an age-old enigma: although one hears the wind (often a deafening storm) and feels the wind (it can bowl you over), one cannot see it (only its, often devastating, consequences). As soon as we move from walls to screens everything apparently wants to become less material.

The tent wall - whether it is pegged firmly into the ground like at the circus, stretched across a stick like on an umbrella, floating in the air as in the case of parachutes and kits, flying on masts like on a sailing ship or flagpole - is a wind-wall. On the other hand, the wind-wall - in whatever form and equipped with however many windows and doors - is a rock cave. That is why the house, like the rock cave from which it originates, is a dark secret (a "home"); and the tent, like the tree nest whose offspring it is, constitutes a place for gathering and dispersing, a place of windless calm. A house is a place for possessing; it is a possession and this possession is defined by walls. A tent is a place for moving into; it collects the experience of movement and this experience can diversify and branch out through the tent wall. The tent wall is a fabric, a net that is, and on this net experiences are processed: this is reflected in the word "canvass". The canvass screen is a textile open to experience (opening itself to the wind, the spirit) and storing this experience. From the earliest times the tent wall in the form of carpets has stored pictures; since the invention of oil colours it has stored paintings hung on walls; since the invention of the television it serves as a screen for electromagnetically woven images; and since the invention of computer-plotters the now immaterial tent wall allows pictures to branch out thanks to its processing fabric. The tent wall billowing in the wind collects experience, processes it and transmits it; and it is the canvass wall that makes the tent a creative nest.

Translation: Stephen Cox

Nomades
p. 70

Humans inhabit – nests, caves, tents, houses, or cubes piled one on top of another. One might even say that the act of inhabiting is inevitable because people *need* habit, because experience only becomes meaningful to us through habitual repetition that a "noise" becomes information. Knowledge of information theory, however, is not required to understand that a wanderer who has no habitat will process information differently from those of us who have permanent homes. Medieval thinkers believed that we were all such aimless tourists, *homines viatores*; that we had lost our heavenly home and must roam erratically through this valley of tears called "the world". For this reason, Maimonides wrote his *Guide to the Perplexed* in the 12th century. Today, we have our *Guides Michelin* when we leave our homes. And yet still we feel unsheltered, exposed, vulnerable. Perhaps this is because our houses are no longer habitable, and we need to look critically at our homes.

A house has been, traditionally, a roof and four walls. The roof is a shield, designed to protect the inhabitants from whatever is above, from what is superior, be it Nature or a Superior Being. Those who hide under the roof are subjects of (and subject to) superior forces, and hope that those forces, be they hail or commandments, will not find them. The builder of roofs, the architect, used to be the most important of all the artists. But we no longer believe in superior forces. We are sovereign people, nobody's subjects, and therefore no longer need such an artist.

A wall also protects the inhabitant from what is outside. It has two sides: the outside faces the "dangerous foreigner" who threatens to invade; the inside faces the indigenous native. But even those of us who still believe in keeping secrets (and in being kept) cannot help but make holes in walls – doors and windows – because even patriots like to take a stroll and look out at what happens. Windows provide vistas; through them we see the outside from the inside. The Greeks called such a vision *theoria*: you need not get wet while looking. But we are no longer convinced that such an uncommitted, "pure" vision provides knowledge. Windows are no longer useful.

Doors permit exits and entrances. One goes out through the door to conquer the world, and loses oneself there; one comes back through the door to find oneself, and loses the world. Hegel called this pendular motion the "unhappy conscience". More problematically, the police (government bureaucracy) may enter through the door, and burglars (private interests) through the window. Doors are not happy inventions.

The global shakeup referred to as the "communications revolution" has reduced the actual structure of the house to ruins. Material and immaterial cables have penetrated it, have made Swiss cheese of it: antennae through the roof, television through the walls, telephones between individual houses. We no longer dwell, but hide in ruins through which blow the blizzards of communications. No use trying to adapt those ruins: a new architecture for people who "survive the revolution" is called for.

To begin, we must relinquish geographical for topological thinking. We can no longer think of a house that is placed somewhere geographically. Take a solar system as an example. We used to think of Earth as occupying a place within that system. Computer-generated images now demonstrate that Earth is a curve within a wire net called "the gravitational field of the sun." We could imagine a house as a curve within the wire net called "human relations". Within that curve, human relations become ever denser, and the house is that point where the relations are densest.

The new house should be "attractive" (in the sense in which Earth is attractive). It should attract ever new human relations. It must be in a constant process of construction. Ever new relations must be its input, and it must process them into information. That information must be transmitted to other houses. The house must become a knot within the human network, a creative knot within which the sum of information at the disposal of humanity (the sum of "culture") increases – which is to say that it must be a knot built on material and immaterial cables.

This is a dangerous architectural project, for we now know only two forms of connecting cables: nets (example: telephones), or bundles (example: television). If the new house were to be part of a bundle (in Latin, *fasces*), it would become a support for an as-yet-unimaginable form of totalitarianism. All the houses would then produce or dispose of the same information (in Nazi Germany this was called *Gleichschaltung*, political coordination and the elimination of opponents). Future architects must take care to avoid such bundling, and to provide for a "dialogical network".

But there is a greater nontechnical – existential – danger. People who inhabit such houses will have nowhere to hide (no roof, no wall); they will have nothing to cling to. They can do nothing but reach out their hands and try to hold onto the hands of other people. And thus, hand in hand, face the void without any guarantee that they won't be swallowed up in it. We must accept that danger, because the alternative is even more dangerous: to go on hiding within the ruins of houses become uninhabitable, or to roam about in motor cars. We must either risk the dangers in becoming upright creators within the void, or continue to settle for the limits of being perpetual squatters.